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Abstract
This paper presents a methodology for the design of optimal transport strategies and the case study results of the methodology for the City
of Edinburgh, using the two multi-modal transport/land-use models MARS and TPM. First, a range of policy instruments are optimised in
turn and their relative impacts explored. Second, optimisations with and without financial constraints are performed and compared. Although
both models produce similar optimal policies, the relative contribution of the instruments differs between models as does the impact on
outcome indicators. It is also shown that by careful design it is possible to identify a strategy which costs no more than the do-minimum but
which can generate substantial additional benefits. The optimisation methodology is found to be robust, and is able to be used with different
transport models, and with and without financial constraints.
q 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Urban transport policy; Cost–benefit analysis; Optimisation
1. Introduction
The concept of integrated transport strategies is not new;
many local authorities in the UK were developing them in
the early 1990 s (May, 1991) and they were a key element in
the first ECMT report on transport and sustainability
(ECMT, 1995). However, few UK Local Transport Plans
(LTPs) can be considered as truly ‘integrated’ as yet in their
approach; they are limited in particular by the resources
available, the unacceptability of demand management
measures, the need to negotiate with operators on public
transport service levels and fares, the lack of understanding
of interactions between transport and land use, and the
timescale for implementing innovative solutions.
There thus remain significant challenges, both in the
short-term design of strategies and in the longer term
fundamental understanding of their performance.
Among the key issues are the need to understand how best
to combine the wide range of different policy instruments;
how to identify the optimal combinations of these, given
that most can vary substantially in the ways in which they
are implemented; how to reflect constraints of finance,
institutional responsibilities, technology and public accept-
ability in their design; how to develop implementation
sequences which enhance their performance; and how far it
is possible to transfer strategy specifications from one city to
another.
These issues have been addressed in our previous work
where we have made significant advances in understanding
the design of optimal transport strategies. In our initial
research, the usefulness of optimisation methods to identify
optimal transport strategies was shown (Fowkes, 1998). In
the follow-up research, we studied the performance
of transport policy packages with regard to the level of
implementation OPTIMA (1998); FATIMA (2000), their
financial feasibility and their transferability (May et al.,
2000).
There have been relatively few similar research projects.
The most relevant are TRENEN (Proost, 2000), which used
a simple single-link model of a number of cities to identify
optimal combinations; the ISGLUTI project which
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studied, but did not optimise, land use and transport
strategies (Paulley and Webster, 1991); work by TRL with
their Transport Policy Model, which indicated the relative
merits of policies based on public transport and demand
management in five UK cities, but made no attempt at
optimisation (Dasgupta et al., 1994); and the PROPOLIS
study (Lautso et al., 2004) where a comparative study of the
performance of a range of policy instruments, and selected
combinations, in seven European cities, was conducted
using three different land use transport interaction models.
This paper is one of the several reporting on our work
which aimed to cover these issues by making use of three
time-marching models: MARS (Pfaffenbichler, 2003;
Pfaffenbichler, 2003), TPM (TRL, 2001) and START-
DELTA (Simmonds and Still, 1999). All three models were
used to model Edinburgh in the UK. MARS and TPM also
covered Leeds (UK) and Vienna (Austria), while TPM was
used for another four UK cities: Dundee, Bristol, Exeter,
and Preston. All models were applied with the same
appraisal and optimisation framework to develop optimal
policies. The aim of this paper is to present the
methodology, describe two of the models used—MARS
and TPM—and to present the case study results when
applied to the city of Edinburgh. Each instrument is first
optimised in isolation and its impact discussed in relation to
a welfare-based objective and other outcome indicators.
Then the paper discusses the results of optimising two
packages of instruments using the same objective and
compares the results between models.
In Section 2, we describe the appraisal methodology and
outcome indicators used to compare the relative impact of
the various instruments. We also give a qualitative
description of the MARS and TPM models and outline the
optimisation approach. Section 3 presents the case study
results for Edinburgh from both models with the application
of individual instruments, while Section 4 presents the
optimal packages. Finally, in Section 5 we draw conclusions
and discuss the implications for strategy design.
2. Methodology
In order to appraise different transport strategies, a set of
objectives must be defined against which the policies are
appraised. The objectives of our case study cities are based
on suggestions made in the UK Government’s White Paper
on the Future of Transport (DETR, 1998a,b). Based on this,
we agreed with the cities to use sustainability as an
overarching objective, and took the six underlying policy
objectives to be:
† protection of the environment
† safety and severity of traffic accidents
† economic efficiency
† equity and social inclusion
† contribution to economic growth
† intergenerational equity
Traditionally, strategies are assessed using a cost benefit
analysis (CBA); however, the local authorities have more
recently moved to a target-based approach in response to
national guidelines for monitoring impacts. We have thus
also developed an alternative approach to CBA which is
based on goal achievement with respect to targets for
indicators which reflect the policy objectives stated above.
A full comparison of policies resulting from these two
appraisal approaches is presented elsewhere (Emberger et
al., 2003).
2.1. The CBA-based approach
To be able to work with these six objectives, we had to
translate them into an objective function. The objective
function tries also to balance the interests and needs
between present and future generations (Minken et al.,
2003). The objective function (OF) used is based on former
research work carried out in PROSPECTS (May et al.,
2003) and is implemented in both models. The OF consists
of an economic efficiency term (the CBA part or core
objective), and a term for monetised values for CO2 emitted,
local pollution, noise and accidents. All these costs are
discounted over a 30-year evaluation period. Additionally,
the needs of future generations may be considered through a
weighting mechanism within the objective function. For the
case of the City of Edinburgh presented here, we did not
give extra weight to future generations so that results are
more in line with current UK practice. It should be noted
that economic growth is not represented within the objective
function and that equity and social inclusion is only
considered indirectly by looking at impacts on different
modes. In mathematical terms, the objective function can be
written as
OFZ
X30
tZ1
at½UtCPtCEt
where
OF is the objective function
Ut is the user benefit in year t
Pt is the net benefit of providers/operators, includ-
ing the parking operator, toll operator, public
transport (PT) operator, and the Government in
year t
Et is the external benefit from reductions in
accidents, noise, emissions, and CO2 in year t
at is the discounting factor in year t, atZ1=ð1CrÞ
t
r is the discount rate (taken as 3.5% to reflect UK
practice)
The objective function is made up of the net present
benefits of three sectors: users, providers, and externalities.
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The user benefit includes users’ money savings and time
savings from the strategy; the providers’ benefit equals
revenues minus the operating and capital costs; the external
benefits include those from reductions in accidents, noise,
emissions, and CO2. These benefits are calculated from the
transport/land-use models and the appraisal framework.
The above OF and its components are used as a first
means of comparing the relative impacts of the transport
instruments. In addition, we discuss the cost implications of
each instrument in terms of the change in present value of
finance. The Present Value of Finance (PVF) of an
instrument or set of instruments is defined as the net
discounted financial benefit to government and other
providers of transport facilities, both public and private,
over a 30-year time horizon, relative to the do-minimum.
PVF is defined as:
PVFZ
X30
tZ1
atðRtKCtÞ
where
Rt is the revenue of providers/operators in year t
Ct is the cost of providers/operators in year t, including
operating costs and capital costs.
2.2. Optimisation method
The above objective function can be used in an
optimisation process whereby policy instruments are varied
so as to maximise the OF value. We assume that the policy
instruments can in the most general case be applied at any
level in any one year (tZ1,2,.,30). Thus, for a single
instrument there could in theory be 30 different levels in the
optimal solution. In practice we have not attempted to solve
this theoretical problem for a number of reasons:
† The optimal policy should be easily understood and easy
to present to the public and other decision makers.
† Optimisation processes become harder to solve as the
number of variables is increased with increased
likelihood of finding local optima rather than a global
optimum.
† Furthermore, each optimisation requires more comput-
ing time as the number of variables is increased.
† Some software packages used cannot represent instru-
ments varying over time to such a fine degree and/or
many more runs would be required which would be
computer resource intensive.
Whilst some policy options, such as discrete measures
being considered in only one year, can help cut down the
problem, the most efficient and practical method for
trimming the problem down is to limit the variation of all
the instruments over the evaluation period.
The approach adopted here is the same as in
PROSPECTS (Minken et al., 2003), i.e. to specify a
piece-wise linear policy profile where policy instrument
levels are optimised for two points in time, tA the
implementation year and tL the long run year. Thus we
need only specify the year of implementation, tA, and the
number of years until a long run value is to be expected. It is
assumed that all policy instruments are at the do-minimum
level from 2001 to 2005. Between 2006 and 2016, the policy
instrument values are changed linearly between their values
in those two years. From 2016 to 2030, all policy
instruments are held at their 2016 levels. For the single
instrument optimisation tests reported here we further limit
the profile such that the policy is constant over time, i.e. the
value used in the implementation year is equal to that used
in the long run year and all other subsequent years. This
allows a simple search technique to be applied to obtain the
optimal single instrument values.
For the optimisation of packages of instruments, we
optimise the OF subject to constraints on predefined ranges
of instrument and also subject to financial constraints. The
financial constraints may be imposed either on the PVF of
all operators/providers, indicating that the strategy is
self-financing, or on the PVF of the PT operator only, in
which case the PT operator breaks even. The former allows
for cross-subsidies between sectors whereas the latter
ensures that the public transport sector is self-financing.
In this paper, both unconstrained and constrained
optimisation problems are solved using the Downhill
Simplex method (Nelder and Mead, 1965), via the
AMOEBA routine (Press et al., 1990). To implement the
constraint in the optimisation procedure, we add a penalty to
the objective function whenever the PVF is negative. We
have found that the optimisation method is robust, and able
to be applied with different transport models, and with and
without financial constraints.
2.3. Other transport-related indicators
Rather than simply compare instruments in terms of the
objective function, we also compare the impact on certain
key outcome and process indicators which describe how the
transport system is responding. This analysis combined with
the CBA analysis provides further understanding of the
relative performance and value for money of the instru-
ments. The indicators considered for the MARS model are
the changes relative to the do-minimum in trip-km and
average speed for all modes by peak and off-peak periods
and cost of accidents and tons of CO2 for private cars in
peak and off-peak periods. Transport emissions for public
transport are calculated off-line and included in the
objective function (these are not significant except when
frequencies are increased by a significant amount, thus we
concentrate on car emissions which are affected by all
instruments to some extent).
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OFTraffic impacts reported for TPM include relativechanges in person trips to reflect impacts of policies on
mode shifts, in PCU-kms and average speed to reflect
impacts on road congestion, and in bus occupancies to
reflect impacts on bus patronage.
The above indicators are presented for each instrument
for year 10 (2010) only, partly due to the amount of data
produced and partly because 2010 is used to monitor
progress of indicators against short run targets by local
authorities.
2.4. The MARS and TPM models for the City of Edinburgh
In this paper we use two strategic models of Edinburgh,
MARS and TPM, to model the transport policies and to
output the indicators and OF used in the optimisation
process. MARS (Metropolitan Activity Relocation
Simulator) is a strategic, interactive land-use and transport
interaction (LUTI) model. It was developed as a time-saving
alternative to traditional four-step transport models, saving
on run time by omitting the assignment stage and using area
speed flow relationships in place of a full network. MARS
can model the transport and behavioural responses to
several demand and supply-side instruments. These impacts
can then be measured against targets of sustainability.
MARS assumes that land-use is not a constant but is rather
part of a dynamic system that is influenced by transport
infrastructure. The interaction process is modelled using
time-lagged feedback loops between the transport and land-
use sub-models over a period of 30 years. It should be noted
that in our Edinburgh case study the land use responses to
transport strategies are small and that we do not consider
any land use policies here, i.e. we have ignored the impacts
associated with changes in attractions and productions.
For a full description of the MARS model, see
Pfaffenbichler (2003).
TPM (Transport Policy Model) is a multi-modal strategic
transport model developed at TRL for forecasting the
impact of transport policies, individually or in combination,
at a town or city-wide level, taking into account changes in
socio-economic conditions. In contrast to some large-scale
spatially detailed transport models, TPM is a spatially
aggregate modelling tool designed for ease of use, and with
the ability to assess urban transport policy impacts rapidly
and with very limited data requirements. For a full
description of TPM, see TRL (2001). In this paper, the
land use changes over time in TPM are exogenous inputs;
they are not responsive to changes in transport costs and
accessibilities in the model. The changes in population and
car-ownership over the 30 years are taken from the UK
multi-modal transport studies database TEMPRO.1 In
Paulley et al. (2004), a land use model has been integrated
into TPM so that the impacts of interactions between
transport and land use can be modelled.
Table 1 gives a comparison of the two models in terms of
supply and demand representation.
The main differences between MARS and TPM are the
number of zones, the segmentation of demand, and the
assumption about constant travel time budget which
constrains the demand response and modelling of land use
responses. MARS is spatially more detailed with OD-
specific speed-flow curves, TPM has only three zones but up
to eight trip purposes and modes and greater detail in car-
ownership/household categories and hence demand
responses. TPM also has a public transport crowding
model. Neither model includes route choice nor a time of
Table 1
Comparison of MARS and TPM features for Edinburgh application
Model feature MARS TPM
Number of zones 25 zones: usually administrative boundaries Three concentric zones: inner, outer, external
Modes of travel Three modes: Car, Public Transport, Slow Up to eight modes
Congestion effects OD-specific speed-flow curves for commute trips. No speed
effect for other trips (assumed to be in the off-peak)
Zone-specific speed-flow curves for peak and inter-peak for road
modes, and over-crowding model for Public Transport modes
Generalised costs In-vehicle time, money, access/egress, parking search time, wait
times, change times
In-vehicle time, money, access/egress, parking search time, wait
times
Journey purposes Commute, other Up to eight purposes
Time periods Peak, off-peak AM peak, inter-peak
Levels of car-owner-
ship
0, 1 0, 1,S2
Demographics/
household categories
Average household size, employed residents, cars per head,
average income per zone
Exogenous: population, age group, household size, cars per head
and employment; Endogenous: population age group segregated
by car-ownership levels
Route choice No No
Mode/destination
choice
Simultaneous Simultaneous
Time of day choice No No
Demand response Commute trips inelastic. Constant time budget Elastic demand by journey purpose, mode, and car-ownership
household category
Land use response Yes No, with exogenous land use factors
1 http://www.tempro.org.uk/
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day response, both performing simultaneous mode/destina-
tion choice.
Although both MARS and TPM were implemented for
Edinburgh, they are based on different geographical areas.
The MARS model for Edinburgh is made up of 25 zones
with 14 zones representing the urban area and 9 larger zones
representing the surrounding regions. TPM models Edin-
burgh using the three-zone system. The TPM inner zone
covers the city centre of Edinburgh, and the outer zone
(together with the inner zone) covers the City of Edinburgh
district. The external zone covers a much larger area than
that used in MARS but here only travel to and from the
urban area is modelled.
Table 2 provides some basic information used in the
models to describe the cities and modelled areas in terms of
size, population and in modal split. Note that the modal split
varies between models as TPM includes only slow mode
trips that are substitutable by other modes, whereas the
MARS model includes all slow mode trips. Note also that
the external zone in TPM represents the catchment area of
the majority of commuters travelling to or from the inner or
outer zone; trips originating from the external zone and
terminating at the external zone, or vice versa, are not
modelled. Although the external zone can have a large
population, the trip generation rates are much lower.
Therefore, the number of trips generated from and attracted
to the external zone is much smaller.
3. Relative impacts of single instruments
This section describes the tests conducted for single
instruments and discusses the results in terms of relative
impacts and make up of the objective function OF.
3.1. Tests conducted
Table 3 shows the single instruments tested, the area of
application, the ranges tested and the optimum value within
this range obtained via sensitivity tests for MARS and TPM.
Note that in TPM, parking policies (charges and provisions)
were not considered for optimisation in this study as their
responses and hence impacts were thought to be similar to
cordon charges. Also, TPM models fuel tax changes as a
scenario variable rather than a policy lever.
3.2. Comparing the instruments in terms of CBA
Tables 4 and 5 show the CBA results with component
parts and the PVF values for MARS and TPM tests,
respectively.
First, it should be noted that we cannot compare the CBA
results directly as the models were set up with different
study areas and the instruments were therefore applied to
different populations. However, if we look first at the
optimal instrument values for common instrument tests we
Table 2
Overview of case study data
Model Population (000 s) Area (km2) Modal split (%) Cars/1000 population
Zone/mode Inner Outer External Total Inner Outer Total SL PT PC All zones
MARS n/a n/a n/a 1071.8 n/a n/a 2305 22 25 54 371
TPM 58.0 393.5 2288.4 2739.9 28 352 n/a 13 23 65 342
SL: slow modes; PT: public transport; PC: private car.
Table 3
Tests conducted and optimum single instrument values
Instruments Application MARS range Optimum MARS TPM range Optimum TPM
Fares peak Study area K50 toC100% K50% K50 to C100% K45%a
Fares off-peak Study area K50 toC100% K50% K50 to C100% K45%a
Frequencies peak Study area K50 toC200% 50% K50 to C200% 140%
Frequencies off-peak Study area K50 toC200% 25% K50 to C200% 80%
Cordon charge both periods Cordon around zone 1 N/A N/A V0–8 V5.65
Cordon charge peak Cordon around city centre V0–6 V5.0 N/A N/A
Cordon charge off-peak Cordon around city centre V0–6 V2.0b N/A N/A
Parking charge short stay City centre V0–6 V2.0c N/A N/A
Parking charge long stay City centre V0–6 V5.0c N/A N/A
Road capacity peak Study area K10 toC5% 5% N/A N/A
Road capacity off-peak Study area K10 toC5% 5% N/A N/A
Fuel tax Study area K50 toC200% 200% N/A N/A
Fuel efficiency Study area 1% p.a. 1% p.a. N/A N/A
Smart card (bus speed
increase)
Study area N/A 0–5% 5%
a The optimum fare change for TPM lies on the K50% limit but tests were conducted in 15% steps.
b The optimum value of off-peak cordon charge in MARS is actually zero. The value V2 was used to provide a comparison with short stay parking charges.
c The long stay parking charge for MARS was set to be equal to the peak cordon charge to provide a direct comparison.
JTRP 747—12/9/2005—21:59—-[-no entity-]-—164434—XML MODEL 5 – pp. 1–17
S.P. Shepherd et al. / Transport Policy xx (xxxx) 1–17 5
DTD 5 ARTICLE IN PRESS
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D P
RO
OF
can see that both models suggest significant reductions in
fares in both the peak and off-peak periods, bounded by the
lower limit. It should be noted that both models assume that
operating costs do not vary with patronage; TPM does,
however, include a user cost in the form of an overcrowding
model.
Both models suggest significant increases in bus
frequencies. The increases suggested by TPM are far greater
than those suggested by MARS as the combined effect of
reduced wait times and reduced overcrowding results in
significantly higher time savings for public transport users.
The optimal cordon charges from TPM and MARS are
similar (around 5V).
Looking at the MARS results in more detail, taking the
overall effect on the OF value first, we can see that peak
fare reductions of 50% are almost equivalent in OF terms
to increasing fuel tax by 200%—note that fuel tax
increases affect both periods whereas the majority of
other instruments are applied to either the peak or off-
peak period. The area-wide road capacity improvements
also provide significant increases in the OF value. It
should be noted that if fare reductions or road capacity
changes were applied to both periods simultaneously then
the combined OF values would be greater than for the fuel
tax increase of 200%.
Although we can say that peak fare reductions give a
similar OF value to fuel tax rises and as such would be
judged as similar by an optimisation routine, there are
obvious and significant differences in the impacts on various
groups. For example with fare reductions in the peak, there
are money (1.4 billion euro) and time benefits (328 million
euro) to public transport users and the public transport
operators incur the costs of fare reductions (in excess of 1.0
billion euro). The shift towards public transport use also
brings congestion relief and hence time benefits to car users
(403 million euro). When the fuel tax is increased there are
significant money losses to car users (over 10 billion euro),
some seven times greater than the money benefit to public
transport users with the 50% fare reduction in the peak,
whilst the time benefits to both public transport and car users
are only 23% higher than with a fare reduction of 50%. With
the fare reductions the PVF is in deficit by 1.2 billion euro
which must come from other sources, e.g. the tax payer,
whereas with the increased fuel tax there is a surplus of 10
billion euro over 30 years which could be used to invest in
transport, other sectors such as health and education or to
reduce other taxes.
Looking at the TPM results in more detail, when public
transport fares are reduced, car users’ journey time is
reduced because of a shift of car users to public transport
Table 4
Edinburgh: summary of MARS OF and its elements for individual instruments. (Units are Vm discounted over the evaluation period)
Peak
fare
Off-
peak
fare
Peak
fre-
quency
Off-peak
frequency
Peak
Cordon
charge
Off-
peak
Cordon
charge
Parking
long
stay
Parking
short
stay
Road
capacity
peak
Road
capacity
off-peak
Fuel tax Fuel effi-
ciency per
annum
Change in
instrument level
K50% K50% 50% 25% 5 2 5 2 5% 5% 200% 1%
Spatial coverage Area Area Area Area Central Central Central Central Area Area Area Area
OF 1162 407 156 51 374 K67 172 9 548 912 1178 239
PVF K1217 K1485 K367 K177 1151 699 169 55 73 155 10,105 K553
User ben. Money
PT
1437 1802 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
User ben. Money
Car
88 0 28 0 K1272 K789 K135 K54 63 130 K10,
133
666
User Ben. Time
PT
329 0 378 227 234 0 68 4 203 244 393 K34
User Ben. Time
Car
403 15 125 3 218 4 57 4 261 501 504 -46
User Ben Time
NM
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PT capital 0 0 K22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PT operating 0 0 K454 K301 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PT fares
(operator)
K1082 K1389 133 141 134 18 40 3 44 97 476 K35
Parking revenue K2 K3 0 K1 K18 K14 144 53 2 4 K10 1
Net toll revenue 0 0 0 0 1082 723 0 0 0 0 0 0
Govt. capital 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 K1 K1 0 0
Govt. revenue K133 K93 K24 K16 K43 K29 K14 K1 29 55 9639 K519
Local
externalities
47 48 4 8 13 11 5 0 K46 K99 163 14
CO2 74 26 K13 K11 28 8 8 1 K7 K20 144 192
OF/OF-fuel 98.7% 34.5% 13.2% 4.3% 31.7% K5.7% 14.6% 0.8% 46.6% 77.5% 100.0% 20.3%
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and the accompanying reduction in overall road traffic. Thus
we see positive private transport time savings. For bus users,
reducing fares has two effects: it increases bus running
speed due to congestion relief and it also increases bus
occupancies and crowding, which, in turn, means an
increase in passengers’ perceived travel times. For the
levels of fares reduction shown here, the overcrowding
effects are dominant and bus users incur increased time
costs. Hence, there are negative PT mode time savings.
Further examination of the test results has shown that when
the fares reduction is smaller, increase in bus running speed
dominates, and bus users’ time cost is reduced.
Increases in peak frequencies give the best overall result
in terms of OF value for TPM. This is due mainly to the
significant user benefits for both car and public transport
users coupled with money benefits for car users. As
frequencies are increased, wait times and overcrowding
costs are reduced which cause a large shift from car to
public transport. This in turn gives rise to significant
congestion relief for both modes.
With the introduction of a road charging policy, car
users’ journey time is reduced significantly but they have to
pay highly for the benefits that they receive. On the other
hand, the cordon charge reduces public transport users’ time
costs due to congestion relief. The cordon charge is the only
policy that can generate a significant positive PVF though it
causes the total user benefit to fall. It also generates the
largest external benefits.
In terms of relative impacts of the two models from the
sub-set of common instruments, fare reductions were the best
performing instrument for MARS, followed by changes in
capacity and peak cordon charges, with changes to
frequencies performing poorly in comparison. This contrasts
with the TPM relative performance whereby changes in peak
frequencies outperform all other instruments, followed by
cordon charges and fare reductions. The relatively strong
performance of frequency and poor performance of the fare
reductions can be explained in part by the inclusion of the
overcrowding effect in TPM which outweighs the in-vehicle
time benefits due to congestion relief.
3.3. Comparing impacts on indicators
Fig. 1a–e shows the percentage changes for a number of
key indicators split by peak and off-peak for each instrument
test for MARS. Fig. 2a–d shows the traffic impacts of the
optimal individual policies for each policy instrument in
terms of relative changes in number of trips, PCU-km, road
Table 5
Economic benefits of individual policies for Edinburgh (Vm) for policies obtained from sensitivity analysis using TPM
Policy instruments Fares AM Fares IP Frequency AM Frequency IP Cordon Charge Bus speed
Optimal policy
values
K45% K45% 140% 80% V5.65 5%
OF 563 97 1305 148 695 419
All operators’ ben-
efits (PVF)
K587 K197 K902 K197 910 11
User benefits
Money savings
Private transport
modes
89 2 189 2 K1382 29
Public transport
modes
481 277 0 0 0 0
Time savings
Private transport
modes
452 5 784 3 761 153
Public transport
modes
K34 K45 1040 334 66 166
Total user benefits 987 239 2013 339 K553 348
Operators’ benefits
PT operator K439 K197 K506 K197 118 58
Parking operator K97 0 K310 0 K365 K32
Toll operator 0 0 0 0 1227 0
Government K52 0 K85 0 K71 K16
External benefits
Accident and noise
benefits
42 23 60 11 92 15
Environmental
benefits
24 6 5 K10 52 10
Total external ben-
efits
66 29 65 2 142 24
CO2 benefits 97 24 129 6 198 35
Note: The notations used in the labels for policy instruments are: Fares: fares policy; Frequency: frequency policy; Bus speed: bus speed increase representing
Smart Cards policy which reduce boarding times; AM: AM peak; IP: inter-peak.
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speed, and bus occupancy for TPM. The traffic impacts
shown are for year 10. The optimal individual policy values
can be found in Tables 4 and 5.
Taking the common instruments first, both models
include fare reductions of around 50%, which result in
similar impacts in terms of car use (K5 toK6%) and public
transport use (10 to C14%). However, the speed increases
are greater for TPM than for MARS and TPM predicts a
10% increase in average bus occupancies which is not
modelled in MARS.
Similarly, both sets of tests include a peak cordon charge
of around 5V. Again this produces similar changes in car use
and public transport use with greater increases in speed for
TPM—almostC30% in the central zone andC8% for the
urban area compared to 3.8% for the study area in MARS.
As the optimal frequencies are far higher in TPM than
MARS, the impact on mode shift is as expected much
greater, with public transport trips increasing by 37% for a
140% increase in frequency compared to a 4% increase in
patronage for a 50% increase in frequency with MARS as
shown by the changes in trip-km.
Within the MARS set of tests, the fare reductions and
fuel tax increases impact significantly on trip-km and hence
on mode share. The main difference between fare reductions
Percentage change in trip-km Year 10
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Fig. 1. MARS: Percentage change (a) in trip-km in the peak period—year 10; (b) in trip-km in the off-peak period—year 10; (c) in average speeds in the
peak—year 10; (d) in cost of accidents by period—year 10; (e) in tons of CO2 emitted by period in year 10.
JTRP 747—12/9/2005—21:59—-[-no entity-]-—164434—XML MODEL 5 – pp. 1–17
S.P. Shepherd et al. / Transport Policy xx (xxxx) 1–178
DTD 5 ARTICLE IN PRESS
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795
796
797
798
799
800
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
809
810
811
812
813
814
815
816
817
818
819
820
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836
837
838
839
840
841
842
843
844
845
846
847
848
849
850
851
852
853
854
855
856
857
858
859
860
861
862
863
864
865
866
867
868
869
870
871
872
873
874
875
876
877
878
879
880
881
882
883
884
885
886
887
888
889
890
891
892
893
894
895
896
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D P
RO
OF
and fuel tax is that fare reductions attract new users from
both car and slow modes whereas increased fuel tax reduces
car use while increasing both public transport and slow
mode trip-km.
Increasing road capacity by 5% increases the average
speed of both motorised modes (by less than 5%). The net
effect is to increase car use at the expense of slow modes.
The increase in speeds and trip-km results in significant
increases in the cost of accidents.
All instruments which affect the peak increase the cost of
accidents in the peak due to increased speeds. In addition,
increases can occur in the off-peak as a result of increased
car use (taking up the additional time budget).
CO2 emissions are reduced where speeds are increased
and car use reduced which means that fuel tax and fare
reductions produce significant reductions in CO2. Increased
fuel efficiency results in lower fuel consumption and hence
lower emissions in year 10. Although not shown here these
impacts become more significant over time as the fuel
efficiency is assumed to increase at 1% per annum.
Perhaps, the most interesting result is for peak cordon
charging around the city centre which produced a relatively
Percentage change average speeds : Year 10
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Fig. 1 (continued)
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OFlarge reduction in car use in the peak compared to the area of
implementation or size of the cordon. This is because there
are around 20% of workplaces within the cordon and any
through traffic is also charged.
Within the TPM tests, PT fare and frequency policies in
the AM peak have little effect on traffic in the inter-peak.
This is because departure time choices are not modelled;
there are interactions of trips between time periods only in
the parking model where the parking utilisation in the AM
peak affects the places available in the inter-peak. Another
point to note is that Fig. 2d shows that policies of reducing
fares and introducing a cordon charge both lead to increases
in bus occupancies, but increasing the frequency of buses
has the opposite effect. Although increasing bus frequencies
Percentage change tons CO2 emitted Year 10
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Fig. 1 (continued)
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Fig. 2. TPM: Percentage changes in (a) the number of trips; (b) total PCU-kms by zone; (c) road speeds by zone; (d) bus occupancies. The notations used in the
labels for policy instruments are: Fares, PT fares policy; Frequ, PT frequency policy (applied to bus mode only); CdnChrg, Cordon charge in zone 1; Bus speed,
bus speed increase representing SMART CARDS policy; AM, AM peak; IP, inter-peak.
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can increase bus patronage and hence bus occupancies,
beyond a certain level these frequency increases will lead to
buses becoming less full.
For TPM, all of the individual optimal policies reduce car
trips and increase bus trips. This has the effect of reducing
the total PCU-kms (through the reduction of car traffic) and
increasing the average road speed. For MARS all policies
except road capacity increases and increased fuel efficiency
reduce car use in the peak, whereas car use in the off-peak
may increase if time is saved in the peak through the
constant time budget which reallocates time saved to non-
essential trips.
Finally, there are some patterns which emerge, some of
which are due to the model assumptions:
† Off-peak instruments do not affect the peak as there is no
link back to the peak.
† Peak instruments can affect off-peak travel through the
constant travel time budget in MARS—if time savings
arise in the peak then additional trips or trip-km will
appear in the off-peak.
† In the peak there exists a speed-flow relationship in both
models and so externalities can vary with both trip-km
and speed—the most obvious being changes in costs of
accidents in MARS which can be seen to increase if
speeds increase even with decreased flows. For TPM the
number of accidents does not vary with speed.
† In the off-peak, there is no speed-flow relationship for
MARS and only a small change in speed for TPM due to
lack of congestion, so in general local emissions and
accidents in the off-peak are related to car trip-km
changes.
These differences in the relative performance of
instruments between models (set up for the same city)
both in terms of CBA and other indicators could have
serious implications for policy makers. If funds are limited
and the appraisal mechanism used is based on CBA then the
TPM may favour increases in peak frequencies over peak
fare reductions whereas the MARS model would favour
changes to fares and other instruments before changes to
frequencies. If, on the other hand, a target-based approach
were used, then as the changes in outcome indicators were
greater for TPM than for MARS targets would be met more
easily.
4. Optimisation of policy packages
Three policy instruments are included in the transport
strategies for the City of Edinburgh in both MARS and
TPM: PT fare changes, PT frequency changes, and cordon
charges. In addition, low-cost road capacity changes are
considered in the MARS model. All policy instruments,
with the exception of the cordon charge, are area-wide
policies: they are applicable to the whole study area.
The cordon charge policy is applied within the cordon of the
central area (zones 1, 2 and 12 inMARS and zone 1 in TPM).
Also, each instrument is allowed to vary by time of day—
AM peak and inter-peak—again with the exception of the
cordon charge in TPM, where the same cordon change is
applied in both the AM peak and inter-peak. The cordon
charge policy is specified in terms of absolute figures, such
as V5. All other policies are in terms of relative changes.
For example, a PT fare policy ofK20%means that the fares
are reduced by 20% relative to the do-minimum. Finally, in
TPM, the fares policy is applicable to both bus and rail
while the frequency policy is applicable only to bus.
The following two packages of transport policies are
defined:
† Package 1: bus frequency and cordon charge policies in
both MARS and TPM, and capacity improvements in
MARS only.
† Package 2: as for Package 1 but including the
optimisation of PT fare changes.
The PT fares policy is excluded in Package 1 because
local authorities do not have influence over PT fares. Thus,
Package 1 corresponds to the current institutional arrange-
ment while Package 2 the future institutional arrangement.
It is necessary to define the ranges within which each
policy instrument could be adjusted for optimisation. These
were based on practical and acceptability constraints and on
discussions with the cities. The upper and lower policy
bounds that were applied during the optimisation pro-
cedures are as follows:
† PT fares:K50 to C100%
† PT frequency: K50 to C200%
† Cordon charge: 0 to 10V
† Road capacity: K20 to C5%
As has been mentioned, two types of financial constraints
are considered, as follows:
† The whole strategy should be self-financing.
† The PT operator should at least break-even at the
evaluation discount rate.
Both constraints are considered in the MARS and only
the first constraint is modelled in TPM, although some
constrained solutions are found by sensitivity analysis rather
than by running a constrained optimisation.
4.1. The Edinburgh optimisation analysis using MARS
4.1.1. Package 1—unconstrained solutions
Table 6 shows the percentage changes in peak and inter-
peak PT frequencies in year 2006 and year 2016, the peak
and inter-peak cordon charge in euros in years 2006 and
2016, and the percentage change in road capacity for all
periods and all years for the optimal policy set—note that
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the upper bound of 5% for road capacity change is always
met so the presentation is simplified to one column. The
final three columns show the objective function value,
the change in PVF and the change in value of finance for the
public transport operator.
The optimal unconstrained solution S1 consists of a 5%
increase in road capacity across the whole study area, which
is the upper bound for this instrument; increases in PT
frequencies in both periods which increase over time; and
the introduction of peak period cordon charges which also
increase over time. Note that there are no charges in the
inter-peak as the model assumes that there is no congestion
in the inter-peak - hence the optimal charge should be zero.
As the road capacity change is on the upper bound, test
S1–S2 was conducted to show the effect of removing the
additional area-wide road capacity, i.e. it is assumed that
capacity is unaltered over the period of study. The objective
function value drops by 72% which shows the important
contribution that road capacity improvements make. The
road capacity improvement here is an area-wide policy.
Other tests (Emberger et al., 2004) have shown that
applying a 5% increase in capacity to radial movements
contributes only 3.5% of the area-wide capacity
improvements.
4.1.2. Package 1—finance-constrained solutions
For the unconstrained optimal solution, there is no
problem with the first financial constraint; the revenues
collected from the cordon charge outweigh the capital and
operating costs associated with the PT frequency changes
and for the low cost road capacity changes.
However, for the optimal strategy S1 the PT operator
loses in the region of V222m over the evaluation period and
in the case with no change in road capacities (S1–S2) the
operator loses around V379m. Thus, there is a significant
subsidy requirement to support the increased PT frequencies
in both cases.
The obvious way to reduce the cost to the operator is to
reduce the increase in frequencies. A number of sensitivity
tests were conducted, with road cordon charges and capacity
changes set as before, to find where the break-even point
occurred for the PT operator. Thus, we have not optimised
the objective function with a finance constraint, though this
is possible; we have simply looked for where the constraint
is binding by varying the levels which affect the finance for
public transport operators. Table 6 shows the highest
scoring combinations which just break-even; these are
coded S1b and S1–S2b for the cases with and without
capacity changes.
Note that in the first case with capacity increases, the
long run change in frequency is C23%, whereas with no
capacity increases the long run change is onlyC11%. This
is because the public transport users benefit from the
increased speeds due to increases in road capacity which
bring a greater mode shift to public transport from slow
modes which, in turn, pays for additional services. Note also
that the strategy S1b provides the best financial return (with
the highest PVF) and with no subsidy required to PT
operators.
In the ‘with capacity’ case (S1b) the break-even
constraint has only reduced the objective function value
by around 3% (V54m), whereas in the ‘no capacity change’
case (S1–S2b) the objective function value is reduced by
V102m or 18%. This is due to the greater operator losses in
the initial unconstrained optimum without capacity changes
compared to those with capacity changes, which have to be
recouped by a greater reduction in services.
4.1.3. Package 2—unconstrained solutions
Table 7 shows the optimisation results for Package 2.
Note that the fare changes are optimal at the lower bound of
K50% for both periods and all years.
S2 has increases in PT frequencies of 60%—higher than
for Package 1. This can be explained by the fact that the fare
reductions attract more users who then benefit from the
reduced wait times and hence justify greater increases in
service levels. However, the objective function is relatively
insensitive to changes in frequencies and the fare and road
capacity changes contribute over 80% of the final value.
This confirms that fare reductions and capacity changes
dominate the solution and are in this case on their lower and
upper bounds, respectively. The addition of fare changes
increases the objective function value from S1 by 75%.
4.1.4. Package 2—finance-constrained solutions
The unconstrained optimum resulted in fare reductions of
50% and increases in PT frequency of 60%. The large fare
reductions and increases in frequency mean that both
financial constraints are broken this time. Various
Table 6
Package 1 optimisation results for MARS with and without finance constraints
Optimis-
ation num-
ber/code
Fre-
quency
AM
2006 (%)
Fre-
quency
AM
2016 (%)
Fre-
quency
IP 2006
(%)
Fre-
quency
IP 2016
(%)
Road
Price
AM
2006 (V)
Road
Price
AM
2016 (V)
Road
Price IP
2006 (V)
Road
Price IP
2016 (V)
Road
capacity all
periods and
years (%)
objective
function
(Vm)
PVF
(Vm)
PT oper-
ator’s
PVF
(Vm)
S1 25 50 30 40 3.2 5.75 0.0 0.0 5 2067 798 K222
S1–S2 25 50 30 40 3.2 5.75 0.0 0.0 0 569 551 K379
S1b 20 23 20 23 3.2 5.75 0.0 0.0 5 2013 1073 4.4
S1–S2b 10 11 10 11 3.2 5.75 0.0 0.0 0 467 1002 3.0
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sensitivity tests were conducted by varying fares and
frequencies around the S2 solution to lower costs to
operators.
S2b is the solution which ensures that the PT operator
breaks even. Notice that the fare reductions are now only
5% and the frequency changes are onlyC5%. The costs of
the frequency changes are balanced by increased fare
revenues (despite the 5% reduction in fares). Since the road
cordon charges were not revised downwards this solution
results in a large PVF overall. Fares are then reduced further
to find where the PVF constraint is just broken.
S2-pvf-opt shows the optimised result where all variables
are allowed to vary. This solution shows that re-optimising
the road prices upwards in the peak and introducing them in
the off-peak allows us to retain the 50% fare reductions in
the peak, and to retain most of the fare reduction in the off-
peak. The long-term frequency increases are similar to the
unconstrained levels but the increases are delayed to help
meet the PVF constraint—discounting seems to play a role
here. With all instruments allowed to vary, the PVF-
constrained optimum reduced welfare by only V402m or
11%.
4.2. The Edinburgh optimisation analysis using TPM
4.2.1. The optimal transport strategies
As with the MARS model, two packages of transport
policies with and without fares changes, and with and
without financial constraint are identified. Optimal strat-
egies obtained for Edinburgh in Packages 1 and 2, with and
without the constraint that PVFR0, are listed in Table 8.
Consider first the unconstrained optimisations. In general
terms, the optimal strategy in Package 1 is to increase bus
service levels and to apply a cordon charge to the central
area. When the PT fares policy instruments are introduced in
Package 2, the optimal strategy is to reduce them. The fare
reductions are either at, or very close to, the lower bound of
K50%.
It is interesting to compare the optimal strategies within
Package 1 to those in Package 2. The bus service level
increase in Package 2 is greater than in Package 1. This can
be understood in terms of the fare reductions leading to
greater bus patronage and hence a need for more buses to
avoid overcrowding and to ensure that all new passengers
may be accommodated.
When the financial constraint is included in the
optimisation of Package 1, we see that PT frequencies are
increased by much smaller percentages than in the
unconstrained case. Cordon charges are higher when
satisfying the financial constraint than when the constraint
is not applied. In the optimal strategy of Package 2, where
fares policies can be varied, the constrained solution has
smaller fare decreases than the unconstrained solution. In
2006, AM peak fares are actually raised by 36% relative to
the do-minimum case and remain higher than in the do-
minimum for virtually all of the period from 2006 to 2016.T
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The reason is that fares are raised to help meet the financial
constraint. This will be confirmed in the next subsection. By
comparing the two financially constrained optimal strategies,
we can see that the PT frequency and cordon charge are very
much the same. Therefore, one cannot expectmuch reduction
in fares when fares are allowed to change. We can also
compare the constrained Package 2 strategy with the
unconstrained strategy. The frequency increases in the
constrained strategy are only one-third of those in the
unconstrained strategy. The cordon charge is applied only in
the central area. Therefore, the only way to reduce the
financial requirement is to increase fares. Again, this will be
discussed further in the next subsection.
4.2.2. Impacts of the optimal strategies
The optimal transport strategies maximise objective
achievements by reducing total traffic volumes (vehicle-
km) and so increasing road speeds. Fig. 3 shows relative
changes in person trips by mode which result from the
constrained and unconstrained optimal strategies of the two
packages. The results are given for the mid-term year of
2010.
The first point to note from the figure is that all strategies
reduce car trips and increase bus trips. There are larger
mode shifts to buses from cars in Package 2 than in Package
1 in the unconstrained strategy packages, as can be expected
from the differences in the optimal strategies of the two
packages—there is a 50% reduction in PT fares and a much
higher frequency increase in Package 2. This is true only in
the inter-peak in the constrained cases, however. The bus
patronage is actually lower in the AM peak in Package 2
than in Package 1. This is simply because buses are made
less attractive by increased fares in Package 2. The effect of
the constraint is that the smaller increase in PT service
levels in the constrained case leads to a smaller shift away
from car in both time periods.
The economic impacts of the optimal strategies are
summarised in Table 9. Note that the figures listed in the
tables are in terms of benefits (discounted values and
relative to the do-minimum) through the implementation
of the optimal strategies. Thus, positive values imply
benefits and negative values imply costs, in all cases.
Note also that each optimisation is listed in one column
of the table.
Table 8
Optimal transport strategies with TPM for the two packages with and without financial constraints
Policy Year Time Unconstrained Package 1 Constrained Package 1 Unconstrained Package 2 Constrained Package 2
Fares (%) 06 AM – – K46 36
Fares (%) 06 IP – – K48 K40
Frequency (%) 06 AM 127 89 188 70
Frequency (%) 06 IP 103 77 198 65
Cordon charge (V) 06 All 1.84 3.95 2.42 2.84
Fares (%) 16 AM – – K50 K2
Fares (%) 16 IP – – K49 K31
Frequency (%) 16 AM 123 68 120 66
Frequency (%) 16 IP 98 69 104 67
Cordon charge (V) 16 All 4.02 5.18 2.23 5.48
Relative changes in trips by mode from optimal transport strategies
-50%
0%
50%
100%
Unconstrained
Scenario 1
Constrained
Scenario 1
Unconstrained
Scenario 2
Constrained
Scenario 2
Car_AM
Bus_AM
Car_IP
Bus_IP
Fig. 3. Relative changes in person trips by mode in 2010 from optimal
transport strategies for the two policy packages with and without financial
constraints—TPM.
Table 9
Economic impacts of optimal transport strategies with TPM for the two
policy packages with and without financial constraints
Benefits (Vm) Uncon-
strained
Package 1
Con-
strained
Package 1
Uncon-
strained
Package 2
Constrained
Package 2
Car user money
saving
K553 K921 K95 K950
PT user money
saving
0 0 965 139
Car user time
saving
1006 997 1171 955
PT user time
saving
1415 1068 1623 1002
Parking operator
revenue
K626 K634 K782 K568
PT operator
revenue
556 469 K373 353
PT operator cost K1108 K706 K1318 K652
Toll operator
revenue
760 1026 503 1010
Toll operator
cost
K44 K44 K44 K44
Government
revenue
K110 K108 K137 K100
External benefit 387 432 574 455
Objective
function
1685 1577 2085 1598
Total user
benefits
1868 1144 3663 1145
Value of finance K571 2 K2152 0
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Consider first the optimal strategy of the unconstrained
Package 1 scenario. The strategy brings about time
savings for both car users and PT users, though for car
users, the package involves a monetary cost from road
charging. The PT operator gets increased revenue from
increased PT patronage, but the revenue is outweighed by
increased capital and operating costs due to bus
frequency increases. The toll operator, on the other
hand, enjoys a relatively large profit from the road
charging. Note that the reduction in parking operator’s
revenue is due to reduced car trips.
With reduced fares in the unconstrained Package 2
scenario, there is a relatively large increase in PT users’
money savings and time savings compared with Package 1.
The benefits for car users are also larger. As a result, the
total road users’ benefits are much larger than those in the
unconstrained Package 1. However, the PT operator incurs a
large loss of revenue due to reduction of fares. The capital
and operating costs for the PT operator are also larger
compared with Package 1 due to a larger increase in bus
frequencies. As a result, the Package 2 strategy is more
expensive than that of Package 1, with much lower values of
finance. On the other hand, the objective function is
increased by 24%, indicating clearly the benefits to be
gained from a fares reduction.
In the absence of the financial constraint, neither of the
two strategies is self-financing. When financial constraints
are imposed, the values of the objective function for the
constrained strategies were lower than for the unconstrained
strategies. This can be explained by examining the main
elements that constitute the objective function.
For both constrained policy packages, the user benefits
are reduced in comparison with the unconstrained strategies.
Higher cordon charges lead to lower money savings for
private transport mode users, while less intensive fare
reduction strategies lead to substantially lower money
savings for public transport users in Package 2. There are
lower time savings for all road mode users. This occurs
because of the smaller mode shift from car to public
transport that results from smaller fare decreases and fewer
bus services. These two points lead to total user benefits that
are much lower for each package’s constrained solution than
for its unconstrained one. The reduction in user benefit is
particularly stark in Package 2. Also in the constrained
cases, total operator revenues increase considerably. This
increase is most noticeable in Package 2 where the PT fares
were increased in the AM period. Operator costs, both
capital and operating, are lower in the optimal strategy with
the finance constraint. Once again, this is due to the lower
number of additional PT services introduced in the
constrained optimal strategy. Thus, the net benefit for PT
operators is increased.
The financially constrained optimal strategies for
Edinburgh save the transport operators money by cutting
back on the introduction of additional PT services, and
therefore on the capital and operating costs. However, the
main source of the positive PVF seems to be the enormous
increase in revenues that is generated by higher PT fares and
a higher cordon charge. This is particularly the case in
Package 2, in which the PT operator’s revenue changes from
negative to positive and the toll operator’s revenue is
doubled with the introduction of the constraint. Users are
much worse off than in the unconstrained strategy; they are
persuaded to switch modes more by the ‘stick’ of higher
costs for private transport modes, rather than by the ‘carrot’
of better public transport.
5. Conclusions and implications for strategy design
This paper has investigated the contribution of individual
policy instruments and the design of optimal policy
packages by using two models of the same city to assess
welfare gain using a comprehensive objective function. The
two models produce consistent results for some conclusions,
but differ in the predicted magnitude of effect for others.
Both models produce similar recommendations for
change for individual instruments, with often similar
optimal levels. Fares should be reduced towards the lowest
level tested, ofK50%. Public transport frequencies should
be increased by 50% in the peak and 25% in the off peak
according to the MARS model, but by around three times
these levels according to the TPMmodel. Cordon charges of
around V5 should be introduced to enter the city centre in
the peak.
The models agree that peak period interventions are more
effective than off peak ones, though neither model was
particularly effective in modelling off peak cordon charges.
The models differ in their assessment of the most effective
individual policy instruments. The MARS model suggests
that fares reductions and fuel tax changes produce the
greatest welfare gain. Cordon charges are more effective
than public transport frequency increases, and also more
effective than parking charge increases. Low cost increases
in capacity are shown to be beneficial overall, but to
increase car use, and hence accident and emission costs. The
TPM model suggests that peak period frequency increases
are the most effective, and that cordon charges are more
effective than fare reductions.
Both models indicate the same process for the
achievement of welfare gain, with the principal benefit
arising from travel time savings to users, and with
substantial money transfers between users, operators and
the government, depending on the nature of the policy
instrument. The scale of impact was typically larger for the
TPM model than the MARS model.
Optimal strategies were tested in six ways: a package
of measures which excluded fares changes, which are
currently outside local authority control in UK cities
other than London; a package which included fares
changes; two similar packages with constraints to ensure
that the public transport operator breaks even; and two
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similar packages constrained to ensure that the overall
transport system pays for the improvements made over a
30 year period.
The models agree that the unconstrained optimum
strategy without fares changes involves increases in public
transport frequency and the introduction of a cordon charge
to enter the city centre. The MARS model suggests
frequency increases of 50% in the peak and 40% off peak
by 2016, while TPM suggests 120 and 100%. MARS
advocates a cordon charge ofV5.75, and TPMV4.00 by the
same date.
The models also agree that, with fares allowed to be
varied, they should be reduced by around 50% to achieve
the optimum performance, with frequencies further
increased. MARS suggests a 60% frequency increase by
2016, while TPM suggests an increase of around 200% by
2006, settling down to around 120% by 2016. The models
differ in the assessment of the further changes needed in
cordon charges; MARS proposes a modest further increase
to V6.00, while the TPM suggests that the charge in 2016
could be reduced toV2.20. MARS suggests that the optimal
strategy with fares changes included is 75% better than the
strategy which excludes fares, while TPM estimates a 25%
improvement.
The requirement for the public transport operator to break
even is not surprisingly a more severe constraint on the
optimal strategywhich includes fares reductions. TheMARS
model suggests that in the first package, modest changes to
frequency increases and cordon charges could enable the
operator to break even with a reduction in welfare gain of
only around 3%. Conversely in the second package the fares
reductions and frequency increases have to be severely
curtailed, losing over 40% of the strategy’s benefits.
The requirement for the strategy overall to pay for itself
is less demanding. For MARS the package without fares
reductions requires no change, while that with a fares
reduction requires a lower frequency increase and a higher
cordon charge, resulting in a reduction of around 20% in
welfare gain. For TPM, both packages again require lower
frequency increases and higher cordon charges; these are
achieved with reductions of under 10% in welfare gain for
the package without fares reductions, and of around 25% for
the package with fares reductions.
Generally, these results reiterate the importance to
optimal strategies of fares reductions, frequency increases
and road pricing found in earlier research. They thus
strengthen the case for local authorities to be given
powers to introduce road pricing and, in the UK outside
London, to be given back the powers to influence public
transport fares.
The financially constrained strategies demonstrate the
important message that optimal transport strategies need
not be expensive. Optimal strategies have been identified
which pay for themselves in 30 years, and generate
welfare gains of around V3000m, or V6000 per capita as
predicted by MARS or around half these values as
estimated by TPM.
The fact that the two models produced some differing
results in terms of scale of impacts and relative importance
of policy instruments introduces a cautionary note. Policy
makers need to be aware of the assumptions underlying the
models that they use. In this case, it appears that the
principal differences arise from the inclusion of an over-
crowding effect in TPM, and of higher levels of demand
response generally in TPM than in MARS. Such models are
reliable in indicating the direction in which policy should be
taken, which is the most important message from this paper.
The more detailed recommendations on scale of change
need to be checked carefully before policy commitments are
made.
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S.P. Shepherd et al. 
 
Proof corrections – 14/9/05 
 
Please note the following corrections. 
 
Page 2 line 126 the second reference should read Pfaffenbichler and Shepherd, 
2003.  This addresses the reference issue. 
 
Page 5 Table 2.  The formatting of the headings are out of line.  The first total 
should be under population and the second total should be under Area and 
Modal split should be above the three columns SL, PT, PC  Table 2 should 
look like this :- 
 
Table 2: Overview of case study data. 
Model Population (000’s) Area (km2) Modal split* 
(%) 
Cars / 1000 
population 
Zone / 
Mode 
Inner Outer External Total Inner Outer Total SL PT PC All zones 
MARS n/a n/a n/a 1,071.8 n/a n/a 2,305 22 25 54 371 
TPM 58.0 393.5 2,288.4 2,739.9 28 352 n/a 13 23 65 342 
* SL = Slow modes; PT = public transport; PC = private car. 
 
Page 12 Table 6.  The coding has been changed.  Please revert to original coding 
of model runs by replacing S1-S2 with S1-2 and S1-S2b with S1-2b 
otherwise it looks as though we have subtracted a later model run named S2 from 
model run S1. 
 
The references to the runs in the text should also be changed.  These occur on 
lines 1258, 1277, 1302 and 1317. 
 
Also in Table 6, capitalise the heading Objective function. 
 
1 
Table 3 : Tests conducted and optimum single instrument values.  
Instruments Application  MARS Range Optimum 
MARS 
TPM Range Optimum 
TPM 
Fares peak Study area í50% to +100% -50% í50% to +100% í45%*** 
Fares off-peak Study area í50% to +100% -50% í50% to +100% í45%*** 
Frequencies Peak Study area í50% to +200% 50% í50% to +200% 140% 
Frequencies Off-
peak 
Study area í50% to +200% 25% í50% to +200% 80% 
Cordon charge 
both periods 
Cordon around 
zone 1 
N/A N/A 0 to 8 5.65 
Cordon charge 
peak 
Cordon around 
city centre 
0 to 6 5.0 N/A N/A 
Cordon charge off-
peak 
Cordon around 
city centre 
0 to 6 2.0* N/A N/A 
Parking charge 
short stay 
City centre 0 to 6 2.0** N/A N/A 
Parking charge 
long stay 
City centre 0 to 6 5.0** N/A N/A 
Road capacity 
peak 
Study area í10% to +5% 5% N/A N/A 
Road capacity off-
peak 
Study area í10% to +5% 5% N/A N/A 
Fuel tax Study area í50% to +200% 200% N/A N/A 
Fuel efficiency Study area 1% p.a. 1% p.a. N/A N/A 
Smart card (bus 
speed increase) 
Study area N/A  0% to 5% 5% 
*The optimum value of off-peak cordon charge in MARS is actually zero.  The value 2 was 
used to provide a comparison with short stay parking charges. 
**The long stay parking charge for MARS was set to be equal to the peak cordon charge to 
provide a direct comparison. 
***The optimum fare change for TPM lies on the í50% limit but tests were conducted in 15% 
steps. 
2 
Table 4 : Edinburgh : Summary of MARS OF and its elements for individual 
instruments. (Units are m discounted over the evaluation period) 
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Change in instrument 
level 
í50% í50% 50% 25% 5 2 5 2 5% 5% 200% 1%
Spatial coverage Area Area Area Area Central Central Central Central Area Area Area Area
OF 1162 407 156 51 374 -67 172 9 548 912 1178 239
PVF -1217 -1485 -367 -177 1151 699 169 55 73 155 10105 -553
User ben. Money PT 1437 1802 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
User ben. Money Car 88 0 28 0 -1272 -789 -135 -54 63 130 -10133 666
User Ben. Time PT 329 0 378 227 234 0 68 4 203 244 393 -34
User Ben. Time Car 403 15 125 3 218 4 57 4 261 501 504 -46
User Ben Time NM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PT Capital 0 0 -22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PT Operating 0 0 -454 -301 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PT fares (operator) -1082 -1389 133 141 134 18 40 3 44 97 476 -35
Parking revenue -2 -3 0 -1 -18 -14 144 53 2 4 -10 1
Net Toll Revenue 0 0 0 0 1082 723 0 0 0 0 0 0
Govt.Capital 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 0 0
Govt. Revenue -133 -93 -24 -16 -43 -29 -14 -1 29 55 9639 -519
Local externalities 47 48 4 8 13 11 5 0 -46 -99 163 14
CO2 74 26 -13 -11 28 8 8 1 -7 -20 144 192
OF/OF-fuel 98.7% 34.5% 13.2% 4.3% 31.7% í5.7% 14.6% 0.8% 46.6% 77.5% 100.0% 20.3%
 
3 
Table 5: Economic benefits of individual policies for Edinburgh (m) for 
policies obtained from sensitivity analysis using TPM 
 
Policy instruments 
Fares 
AM 
Fares 
IP 
Frequency 
AM 
Frequency 
IP 
Cordon 
Charge 
Bus 
speed 
Optimal policy 
values –45% –45% 140% 80% €5.65 5% 
OF 563 97 1305 148 695 419 
All Operators' 
benefits (PVF) í587 í197 í902 í197 910 11 
User benefits       
Money savings       
Private transport 
modes 89 2 189 2 í1382 29 
Public transport 
modes 481 277 0 0 0 0 
Time savings       
Private transport 
modes 452 5 784 3 761 153 
Public transport 
modes í34 í45 1040 334 66 166 
Total user benefits 987 239 2013 339 í553 348 
Operators’ benefits       
PT operator í439 í197 í506 í197 118 58 
Parking operator í97 0 í310 0 í365 í32 
Toll operator 0 0 0 0 1227 0 
Government í52 0 í85 0 í71 í16 
External benefits       
Accident and noise 
benefits 42 23 60 11 92 15 
Environmental 
benefits 24 6 5 í10 52 10 
Total external 
benefits 66 29 65 2 142 24 
CO2 benefits 97 24 129 6 198 35 
Note: The notations used in the labels for policy instruments are: Fares=fares policy; 
Frequency=frequency policy; Bus speed = bus speed increase representing Smart Cards 
policy which reduce boarding times; AM=AM peak; IP=inter-peak. 
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Optimisation number / code 
Frequency AM 2006 (%) 
Frequency AM 2016 (%) 
Frequency IP 2006 (%) 
Frequency IP 2016 (%) 
Road Price AM 2006 (€) 
Road Price AM 2016 (€) 
Road Price IP 2006 (€) 
Road Price IP 2016 (€) 
Road capacity all periods and 
years (%) 
objective function (€m)  
PVF (€m) 
PT operator’s PVF (€m)  
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Optimisation number / code 
Fare change AM 2006 (%) 
Fare change AM 2016 (%) 
Fare change IP 2006 (%) 
Fare change IP 2016 (%) 
Frequency AM 2006 (%) 
Frequency AM 2016 (%) 
Frequency IP 2006 (%) 
Frequency IP 2016 (%) 
Road Price AM 2006(€) 
Road Price AM 2016(€) 
Road Price IP 2006(€) 
Road Price IP 2016(€) 
Road capacity all periods and 
years (%) 
objective function (€m) 
present value of finance(€m) 
PT operator’s PVF (€m)  
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 Table 8. Optimal transport strategies with TPM for the two packages with and without 
financial constraints. 
Policy Year Time Unconstrained Package 1 
Constrained 
Package 1 
Unconstrained 
Package 2 
Constrained 
Package 2 
Fares (%) 
06 AM - - -46 36 
Fares (%) 
06 IP - - -48 -40 
Frequency (%) 
06 AM 127 89 188 70 
Frequency (%) 
06 IP 103 77 198 65 
Cordon charge 
() 
06 All 1.84 3.95 2.42 2.84 
Fares (%) 
16 AM - - -50 -2 
Fares (%) 
16 IP - - -49 -31 
Frequency (%) 
16 AM 123 68 120 66 
Frequency (%) 
16 IP 98 69 104 67 
Cordon charge 
() 
16 All 4.02 5.18 2.23 5.48 
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Table 9. Economic impacts of optimal transport strategies with TPM for the two policy 
packages with and without financial constraints. 
Benefits (€m) 
Unconstrained 
Package 1 
Constrained 
Package 1 
Unconstrained 
Package 2 
Constrained 
Package 2 
Car user money saving -553 -921 -95 -950 
PT user money saving 0 0 965 139 
Car user time saving 1006 997 1171 955 
PT user time saving 1415 1068 1623 1002 
Parking operator revenue -626 -634 -782 -568 
PT operator revenue 556 469 -373 353 
PT operator cost -1108 -706 -1318 -652 
Toll operator revenue 760 1026 503 1010 
Toll operator cost -44 -44 -44 -44 
Government revenue -110 -108 -137 -100 
External benefit 387 432 574 455 
Objective function 1685 1577 2085 1598 
Total user benefits 1868 1144 3663 1145 
Value of finance -571 2 -2152 0 
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